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The Comptroller's Regulation-An Illusory Remedy
to the Fiduciary Dilemma of National Banks in Light
of Slade v. Shearson, Hammill & Co.
INTRODUCTION

At common law, a trustee had a fiduciary duty to obtain and use
all information at its disposal in making trust investment decisions.,
Thus, it was an "established and unquestioned" practice for commercial bank trust departments to use information generated in
other departments of the bank for trust investment purposes.' The
evolution of insider3 liability under rule 10b-5 of the Securities and
Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act)4 restricted this use of material
inside information5 by banks.' To protect against potential liability
under the securities laws, many banks adopted procedures, metal. Herman & Safanda, The Commercial Bank Trust Department and the "Wall," 14 B.C.
IND. & CoM. L. REv. 21, 21-26 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Herman & Safanda]. See In re
Pate's Estate, 84 N.Y.S.2d 853 (Sur. Ct. 1948); A. Scorr, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 174.1 (3d ed.
1967).
2. Herzel, The Chinese Wall Revisited, Practicing Law Institute on Banks and the Securities Laws in 1977, at 181 [hereinafter cited as Herzel]; Herman & Safanda, supra note 1, at
21-26.
3. The term "insider" is defined in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1968), and 404 U.S. 1005 (1971), petition for rehearing denied, 404
U.S. 1064 (1972), as anyone who "has 'access, directly or indirectly, to information intended
to be available only for a corporate purpose and not for the personal benefit of anyone."' 401
F.2d at 848. Accord, Ross v. Licht, 263 F. Supp. 395, 409 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
4. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78jj; 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1977). "Rule 10b-5 evolved through court
and Commission action in four stages: creation of a private remedy, broadened duty of
corporate officers, imposition of liability on insiders in connection with securities transactions
by themselves and their tippees, and finally, recognition of the tippees as insiders and the
devolution of liability upon them." Solomon & Wilke, Securities Professionals and Rule 10b5: Legal Standards, Industry Practices, Preventative Guidelines and Proposals for Reform,
43 FORD. L. REV. 505, 509 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Solomon & Wilke]. See, e.g., Shapiro
v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974); SEC v. Texas
Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1968), and 404 U.S. 1005
(1971), petition for rehearing denied, 404 U.S. 1064 (1972); Investor's Management Co., 44
S.E.C. 633 (1971); In re Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 43 S.E.C. 933 (1968);
Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
5. The latest pronouncement on materiality by the Supreme Court occurred in TSC
Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976). The Court held that an omitted fact
is material "if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider
it important in deciding how to vote." Id. at 449. Although the case involved materiality with
regard to omitted facts of a proxy statement under rule 14a-9, it is possible to read it as
establishing a standard for rule 10b-5 transactions. See American Bar Association Subcommittee on Securities Problems of Fiduciaries, Problems of Fiduciaries Under the Securities
Laws-An Update, 11 REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 663, 667 (1976) [hereinafter cited as ABA
Subcommittee Update].
6. See Cook, The SEC and Banks, 89 BANKING L.J. 499 (1972).
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phorically referred to as "Chinese walls," 7 to prevent the interdepartmental flow of information.'
The recent case of Slade v. Shearson, Hammill & Co.' casts doubt
on whether banks can effectively raise a Chinese wall as a defense
to an action brought by trust beneficiaries charging bank trustees
with breach of fiduciary duty. Prior to Slade, the Comptroller of the
Currency, in an effort to clarify trust department responsibility
under federal securities laws, proposed an amendment to his regulation dealing with fiduciary powers of national banks.'0 This amendment would have required banks to establish "appropriate policies
and procedures" to insure that trust department decisions were not
based upon material inside information." As a result of Slade, the
proposal was withdrawn and subsequently modified.'"
This article will examine the problem of conflicting fiduciary duties inherent in the operation of large commercial banks providing
diverse services. The general nature, forms, and relative effectiveness of the Chinese wall as a response to that problem will be discussed. Finally, the Comptroller's proposed amendment will be critically analyzed in light of the questions raised by Slade.
7. The origin of the current use of this term is obscure. The concept first appeared as a
"Statement of Policy" in a 1968 SEC rule 10b-5 proceeding, In re Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 43 S.E.C. 933 (1968). Mendez-Pefiate, The Bank "Chinese Wall":
Resolving and Contending with Conflicts of Duties, 93 BANKING L.J. 674, 680 n.15 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as Mendez-Peilate]. Chinese walls have also been used to separate the
investment banking department of brokerage firms, which enter into insider relationships
with clients in the course of underwriting, from the retail sales force. Note, Conflicting Duties
of BrokerageFirms, 88 HARv. L. REv. 396, 412 (1974). See generally American Bar Association
Subcommittee on Securities Problems of Fiduciaries, Problems of Fiduciaries Under the
Securities Laws, 9 REAL PROP., PaOB. & TR. J. 292 (1974) [hereinafter cited as ABA Subcommittee]; ABA Subcommittee Update, supra note 5; Harfield, Texas Gulf Sulphur and Bank
Internal Procedures Between the Trust and Commercial Departments, 86 BANKING L.J. 869
(1969); Herman & Safanda, supranote 1; Huck, The FatalLure of the "Impermeable Chinese
Wall," 94 BANKING L.J. 100 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Huck]; Lipton & Mazur, The
Chinese Wall Solution to the Conflict Problems of Securities Firms, 50 N.Y.U.L. REV. 459
(1975) [hereinafter cited as Lipton & Mazur]; Lybecker, Regulation of Bank Trust Department Investment Activities, 82 YALE L.J. 977 (1973); Schuyler, From Sulphur to
Surcharge?- CorporateTrustee Exposure Under SEC Rule lOb-5, 67 Nw. U.L. REV. 42 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as Schuyler]; Yellon, Trust Investments: Problems Regarding Exchange
of Information between the Trust Departmentand Other Departments Within the Bank, 54
CHI. B. REc. 405 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Yellon].
8. See text accompanying notes 28-36 infra.
9. 356 F. Supp. 304 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), remanded, 517 F.2d 398 (2d Cir. 1974); [1973-1974
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 94,329 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
10. 39 Fed. Reg. 14,510 (1974).
11. Id.
12. 39 Fed. Reg. 28,144 (1974). See text accompanying notes 99-110 infra.
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Comptroller's Regulation
THE PROBLEM FOR BANKS

An important purpose of the Securities and Exchange Act of
1934's was to affirmatively establish that corporate officers could not
use inside information for profit when trading their corporation's
securities." The basic disclosure principles of rule 10b-5, issued pursuant to section 10(b) of the Exchange Act,' 5 reflect the idea that
equal access to information increases public confidence in securities
markets.' " Thus, rule 10b-5 prohibits the use of material inside information in the sale or purchase of any security.' 7
Although banks are required to comply with the high standards
of conduct demanded by rule 10b-5, as trustees they also have a
fiduciary duty to beneficiaries of trusts in their care.'" The duties of
a trustee are more intensive than the duties of other fiduciaries.'"
Trustees must give complete loyalty to the interests of beneficiaries,
"rigorously excluding selfish interests and considerations of the welfare of third persons... ,,"2
When making trust investments, bank
trustees must meet the high standard of care embodied in the prudent man rule. In addition, as corporate fiduciaries, they may be
held to a higher standard of competence commensurate with their
expertise in the investment field. 2' These standards imply that trustees should obtain all relevant information without violating federal
securities laws.
As a major source of commercial credit, banks gain much information in the course of normal relations with corporate customers.
Under the terms of many loan agreements, corporations are required
13.
14.
15.

15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78jj (1970).
Yellon, supra note 7, at 405.
Rule 10b-5 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any
national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1977).
16. Solomon & Wilke, supra note 4, at 539.
17. ABA Subcommittee, supra note 7, at 296.
18. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 2 (1959).
19. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 2, comment b (1959).
20. Yellon, supra note 7, at 407; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 170 (1959). Accord,
Meinhard v. Solomon, 249 N.Y. 458, 164 N.E. 545 (1928).
21. Mendez-Peniate, supra note 7, at 678-79 n.12. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TRUSTS
§ 174 (1959); A. ScoTT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS §§ 174, 227, 227.12 (3d ed. 1967).
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to provide banks with current financial reports and other information relevant to the operation of the business. Some of this information will be "material ' 22 and will not have been disclosed to the
public. The commercial customers from which large banks receive
inside information frequently will be issuers of securities in which
the trust department invests.2 If the information acquired through
commercial lending is used for trust investment purposes, the trustee and the bank may be exposed to enormous liability. 4 ' Other
buyers and sellers of these securities who traded without benefit of
the information possessed by the bank and suffered a loss have a
potential cause of action under rule 10b-5. The threat of liability is
especially acute since the injured party may no longer have to show
privity.26 The problem is of less importance to smaller banks, since
they have few commercial customers whose securities are likely to
be of interest to their trust departments.Y
22.

Bloomenthal lists examples, compiled by the compliance department of a securities

firm, of information which might be deemed "material." The list includes:
Dividend increases or decreases, earnings estimates, changes in previously released earnings estimates, significant expansion or curtailment of operations, a
significant increase or decline of orders, significant merger or acquisition proposals
or agreements, significant new products or discoveries, extraordinary borrowing,
major litigation, liquidity problems, extraordinary management developments,
purchase or sale of substantial assets.
3A H. BLOOMENTHAL, SECURITIES AND FEDERAL CoRPoRATE LAW § 9.13 (1974). For a discussion
of variations on these situations, see Solomon & Wilke, supra note 4, at 522.
23. ABA Subcommittee, supra note 7, at 295. Although some bank critics have argued
that this dual role presents an irreconcilable conflict of interest, the SEC has recognized and
approved the dual function. See SEC Institutional Investors Study Report of 1971, Volume
2, at 468-69. In addition, the United States Department of the Treasury in its report, Public
Policy for American Capital Markets [1974] SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 239, at D-11
and D-12, stated: "In the absence of more persuasive evidence than has been presented so
far regarding the harmful effects of present arrangements, there is no reason to change public
policy in this area." See Morris v. Cantor, 390 F. Supp. 817 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); accord, In re
Hammer's Will, 12 N.Y.S.2d 893, 188 N.E.2d 266 (1963).
24. See ABA Subcommittee, supra note 7, at 296.
25. E.g., Schuyler, supra note 7, at 46. See Financial Industrial Fund, Inc. v. McDonnell
Douglas Corp., 315 F. Supp. 42 (D. Colo. 1970), rev'd and remanded, 474 F.2d 514 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 874 (1973). In the above situation, the bank may be held to be a
"tippee," the "tip" having been passed to the trust department by the commercial department. Herman & Safanda, supra note 1, at 30. See also Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug
Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975) (limiting a private cause of action under § 10(b) and rule 10b-5
to actual purchasers and sellers of securities).
26. ABA Subcommittee, supra note 7, at 296. See Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974); Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446
F.2d 90, 101 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971); Ruder, Texas Gulf Sulphur-The
Second Round: Privity and State of Mind in Rule lOb-5 Purchase and Sale Cases, 63 Nw.
U.L. Rxv. 423, 432-33 (1968).
27. See Herman & Safanda, supra note 1, at 38; Letter from J.F. Coleman, Executive Vice
President, First National Bank and Trust Company, Burlington, Wisconsin, to C. Westbrook
Murphy, Deputy Comptroller of the Currency (September 22, 1976) [unless otherwise indi-
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THE BANKS' RESPONSE-THE CHINESE WALL

In an effort to reconcile conflicting duties and in response to the
threat of liability posed by federal securities laws, many major
banks established so-called Chinese walls between their commercial
and trust departments. 8 Conceptually, the use of a wall "implies
that the trust department acts autonomously on the basis of information generated internally or received from independent
sources."29 In some cases, banks have attempted to achieve departmental autonomy by issuing a policy statement prepared by the
bank's counsel detailing the provisions of section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, 30 rule 10b-5, 3' and the interpretations of these provisions
by the courts and the SEC. 32 Generally, this statement prohibits the
transmission of material inside information from the commercial
department to the trust department and the use of that information
by the latter.33 More often, banks supplement written policies by
physically separating the trust and commercial departments, 3 and
by prohibiting commercial officers from sitting on trust committees.35 As an additional precaution, some banks establish separate
buildings and financial libraries for the two departments. 6
THE

SEC

AND THE CHINESE WALL

The SEC's response to the Chinese wall approach has generally
cated, all letters referred to in subsequent notes, were written to C. Westbrook Murphy,
Deputy Comptroller of the Currency]; Letter from Ted J. Montgomery, Vice President &
Trust Officer, Union County National Bank, Liberty, Indiana (September 18, 1976); Letter
from E.E. Laird, Jr., Vice President & Senior Trust Officer, First National Bank, Jackson,
Mississippi (October 5, 1976); Letter from Thomas V. Mansill, President, First National
Bank, New Castle, Pennsylvania (September 17, 1976); Letter from W. Hunter deButts, Jr.,
Vice President and Assistant Trust Officer, Marshall National Bank and Trust Company,
Marshall, Virginia (October 21, 1976); Letter from John 0. Slonaker, Vice President and
Trust Officer, The National Bank of Bloomington, Bloomington, Illinois (September 22,
1976).
28. Letter from Kenneth G. Bialken and Ned W. Roman, Chairpersons, Federal Regulations of Securities Committee of the American Bar Association, at 4 (October 21, 1976)
[hereinafter cited as ABA Letter].
29. Herman & Safanda, supra note 1, at 27.
30. 15 U.S.C. § 78(j) (1970).
31. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1977).
32. Mendez-Pefiate, supra note 7, at 685 n.34.
33. ABA Letter, supra note 28, at 4. See ABA Subcommittee, supra note 7, at 305; see
also Mendez-Pefiate, supra note 7, at 685 n.34.
34. See Herzel, supra note 2, at 184; Mendez-Pefiate, supra note 7, at 686.
35. See ABA Subcommittee, supra note 7, at 305.
36. ABA Letter, supra note 28, at 4. Chase Manhattan, one of the first banks to establish
procedures to check the flow of material inside information, subsequently adopted a wholly
owned subsidiary met hod; i.e., the trust department became a wholly owned subsidiary of
the bank. Mendez-Peiiate, supra note 7, at 685 n.32.
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been favorable. 7 The Commission initially recognized the feasibility
of creating walls in its acceptance of a settlement offer by Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith for alleged violations of SEC regulations.3 The "Statement of Policy" submitted to the SEC by Merrill
Lynch indicated that material inside information received by the
underwriting department would be confined to that department
and, with certain exceptions, would not be released to anyone outside the department.3 9 The SEC's approval of this procedure, however, was tempered with a warning that it could not determine in
advance whether the procedure would be adequate in all circumstances. 0
THE COURTS' RESPONSE

Courts have had few occasions to consider the merits of bank
walls or to determine the extent to which departmental isolation of
inside information may be a breach of fiduciary duty to trust beneficiaries.4 Moreover, the issue has not yet been raised in a banking
situation. Prior to Slade v. Shearson, Hammill & Co. ,4"however, the
issue did arise in a securities firm context in Black v. Shearson,
Hammill & Co.4 3 Both Black and Slade appear to cast doubt on the
efficacy of a Chinese wall as a defense to an action brought by trust
beneficiaries."
Black v. Shearson, Hammill & Co.
In Black, a partner in the securities firm of Shearson, Hammill
& Co. (Shearson) also served on the board of directors of a company
for which Shearson "made the market."45 As a consequence of his
position, the partner acquired information concerning the. deterio37. See Lipton & Mazur, supra note 7, at 487-88; Solomon & Wilke, supra note 4, at 533.
38. See In re Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 43 S.E.C. 933 (1968). But see
Huck, supra note 7, at 105, stating that the SEC affirmatively disaffirmed Merrill Lynch's
statement as a policy statement of the SEC.
39. Solomon & Wilke, supra note 4, at 533.
40. Id.
41. See Lipton & Mazur, supra note 7, at 476.
42. 356 F. Supp. 304 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), remanded, 517 P.2d 398 (2d Cir. 1974); [19731974 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 94,329 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
43. 266 Cal. App. 2d 362, 72 Cal. Rptr. 156 (1968).
44. See Lipton & Mazur, supra note 7, at 476.
45. "Market maker" has been defined in SEC rule 17a-(9)(f)(1), 17 C.F.R. § 240.17a-9(f)
(1977) as follows:
(1) The term "market maker" shall mean a dealer, who, with respect to a particular security, holds himself out (by entering indications of interest in purchasing and
selling in an interdealer quotation system or otherwise) as being willing to buy and
sell for his own account on a continuous basis other than on a national securities
exchange.
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rating financial condition of the company. Tle information was not
revealed to Shearson's sales staff, who continued to "strongly recommend" the purchase of the company's securities. These recommendations, therefore, were based on inaccurate information.
The buyers of the securities charged that by making purchase
recommendations while in possession of adverse inside information,
Shearson violated the common-law fiduciary duty owed by a brokerdealer to its customers. The partner admitted his fiduciary duty to
customers, but defended on the ground that he could not reveal
information transmitted to him in corporate confidence. The court
rejected this defense, stating "We have been given no sufficient
reason for permitting a person to avoid one fiduciary obligation by
accepting another that conflicts with it."" The partner's further
assertion that he was bound by a "hierarchy of obligations" was
similarly rejected. "The officer-director's conflict of duties is the
classic problem encountered by one who serves two masters. It
should not be resolved by weighing the conflicting duties, it should
be avoided in advance or terminated when it appears." 47 The court
held that the intentional failure of the partner to disclose material
information in these circumstances constituted fraud.
A closer examination of the facts in Black indicates that the result
reached may be defensible. 8 Apparently, upon receipt of the adverse inside information the partner sold most of his personal stock
in the company, yet he encouraged the sales personnel of Shearson
to recommend purchases to others. Thus, the partner appeared to
have prevented the internal communication of the adverse inside
information not in "pursuit of the legitimate goals of the Chinese
wall, but to further his personal interests at the expense of his firm's
trading customers.""
The language of the opinion is disturbingly, and perhaps unnecessarily, broad. As a result, the case is often cited for the proposition
that to avoid liability, the only available alternative is to terminate
relationships that present conflicts of duty,50 a proposition which,
for large commercial banks, is both unworkable and unreasonable.
The holding in Black can be limited, however, since the decision
appeared to turn on the affirmative recommendations of the retail
46. Black v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 266 Cal. App. 2d 362, 368, 72 Cal. Rptr. 156, 161
(1968).
47. Id.
48. See Lipton & Mazur, supra note 7, at 477.
49. Id.
50. See Letter from Neal L. Peterson, Assistant General Counsel, Bank of America, to
John Schockey, Deputy Comptroller of the Currency, at 5 (October 28, 1976).
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sales personnel. 5' Conceivably, if normal trading activity had con52
tinued, no liability would have ensued.
Slade v. Shearson, Hammill & Co.
Slade v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 53 the most recent case in
which the Chinese wall issue is raised, involved an action instituted
under rule 10b-5. The plaintiffs alleged that Shearson, acting as a
broker-dealer, actively recommended a particular stock to its customers although at the time its investment banking department
possessed adverse inside information concerning the issuer of the
securities. 4 At trial, the court denied the plaintiffs' request to require Shearson to reveal to the investing public the material inside
information it received as a result of its investment banking relationship.- There apparently was no authority for the plaintiffs' position that a broker-dealer is compelled to divulge such information. 6
On motion for summary judgment, 57 Shearson contended that as
a matter of law, even if its corporate department knew of the nonpublic information, it could not, until the information was made
public, use it to prevent the solicitation of purchases by its retail
sales force." Moreover, the firm claimed its Chinese wall prevented
communication of the information to its retail brokerage personnel.5 ' The court denied Shearson's motion-and rejected the Chinese
wall as a defense.
It must be remembered ... that Shearson voluntarily entered into
a fiduciary relationship with Tidal Marine, as a consequence of
which it received confidential information. Shearson also voluntarily entered into fiduciary relationships with its customers. It cannot recognize its duty to the former while ignoring its duty to the
latter. Having assumed fiduciary responsibilities, Shearson is required to incur whatever commercial disadvantages fulfillment of
those obligations entail.10
51. See 266 Cal. App. 2d 362, 365, 72 Cal. Rptr. 157, 159 (1968).
52. However, a problem would remain if the courts impute knowledge of inside information from one department to'another. See notes 69-71 and 120-26 infra and accompanying
text.
53. 356 F. Supp. 304 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), remanded, 517 F.2d 398 (2d Cir. 1974); [1973-1974
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. RE. (CCH) 94,329 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
54. 356 F. Supp. at 305.
55. Id. at 307.
56. id.
57. [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 94,329 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
58. Id. at 95,131.
59. This argument is noted in the appellate court's opinion remanding the case. 517 F.2d
398, 401 (2d Cir. 1974).
94,329 at 95,132 (S.D.N.Y.
60. [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
1974). See Lipton & Mazur, supra note 7, at 478.
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Further, the court emphasized that Shearson's reliance on Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,61 was "misplaced . . . inasmuch as Merrill Lynch stands for no more than the proposition that
a broker who receives inside information from an investment banking client cannot reveal same 'to favored customers.' "I2
The district court recognized the serious consequences of its decision in Slade and certified for immediate review the question of
whether an investment banker/broker-dealer who receives adverse
inside information about an investment banking client is precluded
from soliciting customers to purchase that client's securities on the
3
basis of public information which the firm knows to be misleading.
On appeal of this issue, the Second Circuit held that certification
was improperly granted64 and remanded for further factual determinations." The appellate court noted the "tremendous implications"
that the case has for the securities industry and the investing public.
A decision in the case "might possibly even have impacts in the
banking business where bank trust departments are effectuating
transactions in securities of companies with which the bank has a
commercial banking relationship.""
The applicability of the Slade decision to commercial banks remains uncertain. Some commentators state that it is "possible" to
read Slade as limited to securities firms. 7 On the other hand, many
banks are concerned that the decision directly affects their practices. 8
A correlative aspect of the Slade case which is equally confusing
is the suggestion that the court "imputed" the knowledge of the
underwriting division to the sales personnel and "thereby found a
constructive misrepresentation by the salesmen." 6 This
"unarticulated factual premise" is viewed by some as a "judicial
61. 43 S.E.C. 933 (1968).
62. Slade v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP.
(CCH) 94,329 at 95,131 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
63. Id. at 95,130.
64. Slade v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 517 F.2d 398 (2d Cir. 1974).
65. Id. The district court was directed to resolve three factual issues prior to any future
appeals: (1) whether the material information was received before or after the plaintiff's
purchases; (2) whether there was an effective separation of the investment banking department from the retail sales department; and (3) to what extent there. is a difference between
solicitation and recommendation with the purchase of securities. Id. at 402.
66. Id. at 400.
67. ABA Subcommittee Update, supra note 5, at 664.
68. See, e.g., Letter from Samuel S. Fuller, Executive Vice-President, Hartford National
Bank and Trust Company, Hartford, Connecticut (October 19, 1976); Letter from Robert G.
McKenzie on behalf of the administrative council of the Texas Bankers Association (November 30, 1976).
69. Note, Conflicting Duties of Brokerage Firms, 88 HARv. L. REv. 396, 411 (1974).
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criticism of the wall as a defense."7 Thus, if a bank's trust and
lending departments were equated with the internal structure of
Shearson, a trust beneficiary could claim the bank's lending department or senior officers possessed material inside information which
the trust department "knew" at the time it purchased stock in the
failing company for the trust.7
THE CONTROVERSY IN LIGHT OF

Slade

Much of the controversy raised by Slade focuses upon the type of
procedure necessary to shield banks from potential liability. Specifically, the discussion centers around the type of wall best suited to
protect banks.
The "Impermeable Wall"

One prevalent view is that a Chinese wall should be impermeable.
According to this position, no information, whether or not it is
"material inside information," should flow between the commercial'
72
and trust departments.

Those who favor an impermeable wall suggest that the total prohibition on exchange of information avoids the often difficult problem of distinguishing between material and non-material inside information. 3 Proponents assert that material inside information
could not be used legally by the trust department. As a response to
the criticism that an impermeable wall is excessive in light of rule
10b-5's requirements, it is argued that non-material information
would not, by definition, influence investment decisions. Therefore,
the bank could not be held liable for failure of the trust department
to receive the information. Further, an effective impermeable wall
assumes that the trust department has a separate research department capable of obtaining all material public information.74
In addition, an advantage to an impermeable wall is that relative
to other forms of this precaution, its existence is easier to prove.
Provability is an important consideration because the success of the
wall as a defense will depend on whether a court or jury will accept
that it did indeed isolate the particular information in question. 75
Even though trust departments painstakingly comply with internal
prohibitions, a bank still may face liability if it cannot prove the
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Mendez-Pefiate, supra note 7, at 698.
See Mendez-Pefiate, supra note 7, at 697.
See Lipton & Mazur, supra note 7, at 470-71.
Lipton & Mazur, supra note 7, at 466 n.18.
See ABA Subcommittee, supra note 7, at 310.
Id.
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existence and effectiveness of the wall. 76
A major problem with an impermeable wall is that it will inevitably break down at high levels. 77 As a practical matter, it is virtually
impossible to extend the wall to isolate directors and most senior
management from all trust department activities. 7 A bank's directors are "specifically responsible" for the trust department, including the investment and disposition of trust property. 7 Furthermore,
directors are legally responsible for the proper performance of fiduciary obligations in all cases where the bank is a trustee ° Thus,
even though the transmission of information will probably be limited to extraordinary situations,8 ' the possibility of a breakdown in
an impermeable wall nevertheless exists.
The Permeable Wall
Critics of the impermeable wall contend that the procedure is an
extreme reaction to the problem of material inside information and
is neither required by federal securities laws nor by the common law
of trusts. 2 Contrary to protecting banks, it is asserted that an impermeable wall will expose banks to charges of breach of fiduciary
duty by disgruntled trust beneficiaries."
One way to pinpoint the disagreement between those favoring an
impermeable wall and those critical of the practice is to categorize
8
trust department transactions in "positive" and "negative" terms. 1
Positive transactions are securities trades consistent with the material inside information possessed by the commercial depart5
ment-buying on inside good news or selling on inside bad news.
Negative transactions consist of trust department purchases when
the commercial department possesses bad news, or sales when it
76. Address by Martin Lipton to a Practicing Law Institute Seminar on banks and the
securities laws, reported in CXLII AMERICANBAKER 197, October 12, 1977, at 2.
77. See Mendez-Penate, supra note 7, at'698-99.
78. Id.
79. COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY OF THE UNITED STATES, COMrROLLER'S MANUAL FOR
REPRESENTATIVES IN TRUST § 9.7. E.g., N.Y. BANKING LAW § 122 (McKinney 1971) (annual duty
to inspect bank or trust company's financial condition).
80. COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY OF THE UNITED STATES, COMPROLLER'S MANUAL FOR
REPRESENTATIVES IN TRUST § 9.7. See Herman & Safanda, supra note 1, at 35.
81. See Mendez-Penate, supra note 7, at 698-99.
82. See Huck, supra note 7.
83. Id. Huck further asserts that by setting up impermeable Chinese walls, banks admit
to opponents that there is an inherent weakness in the combination of commercial banking
and trust departments. Id. at 104.
84. See Letter from Ray Garrett, Jr., of Gardner, Carton & Douglas, Chicago, Illinois, at
1 (December 28, 1976) [hereinafter cited as Garrett Letter].
85. Id. at 2.
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possesses good news."6
It is generally agreed that a positive transaction exposes a bank
to liability under rule 10b-5, while refraining from this type of transaction does not expose a trustee to liability for breach of fiduciary
duty.87 It is a basic principle of the law of trusts that a trustee has
8
no duty to violate the law in order to benefit its beneficiaries.1
Therefore, trust beneficiaries should have no expectation that a
trustee will use inside information when acting on their behalf.8
The controversy concerning the use of an impermeable wall focuses on negative transactions. Opponents of this procedure point
out that knowledge or awareness of material inside information is
not illegal. Rather, it is the use of such information that is clearly
prohibited by the securities laws.10 In light of Slade, it is maintained
that an impermeable wall justifiably exposes a bank to suits by trust
beneficiaries charging that the bank has prevented adverse information in its possession from reaching bank trustees who could have
refrained from making further investments.8
To avoid this type of liability, a "permeable" wall has been recommended. 2 The main characteristic of a permeable wall is an
administrative structure through which material inside information
relating to corporate customers is channelled. 3 Bank personnel receiving the information inform the trust department that a "hold"
is being placed on transactions in securities of a particular corporate
customer. 4 The "hold" order does not indicate whether the information is favorable or adverse. Therefore, the order itself does not "tip"
the trust department, but simply prevents "negative" transactions
by trustees. By establishing internal procedures in this manner, a
86. Id.
87. Id. at 2, 3.
88. Investor's Management Co., 44 S.E.C. 633, 647 (1971); Cady Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C.
907, 916 (1961); RESATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TRUSTS § 166 (1959); A. ScOT, LAW OF TRUSTS §
166 (3d ed. 1967); Comments of the Comptroller of the Currency, 42 Fed. Reg. 56,338 (1977).
89. Comments of the Comptroller of the Currency, 42 Fed. Reg. 56,338 (1977); Garrett
Letter, supra note 84, at 3.
90. Huck, supra note 7, at 115; Lipton & Mazur, supra note 7, at 473-74. Accord, SEC v.
Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 73 Civ. 2458 (S.D.N.Y. 1976)(rejecting "possession" in favor of "use"
theory for establishing a violation of federal securities laws).
91. Huck, supra note 7, at 108. The argument is equally applicable where a trustee sells
securities when the commercial department has beneficial information. Accord, Garrett Letter, supra note 84, at 3. But see Letter from Martin Lipton, at 1 (September 22, 1976) stating
that Slade did not hold that beneficiaries of trust accounts are entitled to the benefits of
confidential information isolated in the commercial department of a bank.
92. See Huck, supra note 7. For a detailed proposal in setting up a permeable wall, see
Huck's discussion of an "Administered Wall." Id.
93. Id. at 107.
94. Id.
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permeable wall avoids those"transactions which potentially expose
banks to suits by trust beneficiaries. At the same time, it avoids the
use of material inside information in violation of rule 10b-5.s
THE COMPTROLLER'S PROPOSAL

On April 24, 1974, the Comptroller of the Currency proposed an
amendment to the regulation designed to prevent the misuse of
material inside information by bank trust departments." Purportedly, by giving regulatory recognition to the fiduciary dilemma encountered by banks, the legal sufficiency of precautionary procedures would be clarified. 7 The proposed amendment permitted
trust departments to utilize personnel and facilities of other bank
departments but mandated the establishment of "appropriate procedures" to insure that investment decisions were not made on the
basis of material inside information.8
As a result of the Slade litigation, however, final action on the
amendment was deferred." According to the Comptroller, compliance with the regulation would be "extremely difficult" until the
imputation question suggested in Slade was resolved.' °° Noting the
"severe dilemma" that conflicting fiduciary duties pose for banks,
the Comptroller solicited comments on whether an amendment in95. Id. at 104, 108. This type of permeable wall is similar to the use of a "restricted list,"
a device brokers employ to prevent their salespersons from recommending a particular stock
when the investment banking department of the firm is working on an underwriting for the
company. See generally Lipton & Mazur, supra note 7, at 467-70. Some commentators have
expressed the view that a restricted list is not feasible for most large banks because of the
large number of corporate clients from whom inside information could be received. Id. at 509.
See also Comments from Seminar on Banks and the Securities Laws, reported in CXLII
AamicAN BANKER 197, October 12, 1977, at 2; Letter from F. Richard Ford III, Senior Vice
President and Secretary, State National Bank of Connecticut, Connecticut (October 21,
1976).
96. 39 Fed. Reg. 14,510 (1974) (to be codified in 12 C.F.R. § 9.7(d)). This proposed
amendment was as follows:
The trust department may utilize personnel and facilities of other departments
of the bank, and other departments of the bank may utilize the personnel and
facilities of the trust department; however, the trust department shall establish
appropriate policies and procedures to insure that investment decisions of the trust
department are not based upon non-public information, regardless of how that
information may be attained.
The present section, 12 C.F.R. § 9.7(d), adopted November 15, 1972, provides: "The trust
department may utilize personnel and facilities of other departments of the bank, and other
departments of the bank may utilize personnel and facilities of the trust department only to
the extent not prohibited by law."
97. Id. 42 Fed. Reg. 56,338 (1977). See Herzel, supra note 2, at 187-88.
98. 39 Fed. Reg. 14,510 (1974).
99. 39 Fed. Reg. 28,144 (1974).
100. Id. at 28,144-46.
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tended to provide guidance to national banks would be welladvised. ' 0'
Most commentators expressed qualified approval of such an
amendment. 02 However, regardless of the perceived advantages of
a Chinese wall, most stated specific objection to any regulation that
would mandate adoption of the procedure. 0 The comments reflected a concern that a mandatory wall would be onerous and unworkable for small banks. 04 Further, such a requirement would inhibit the legitimate exchange of information between the commercial and trust departments. This exchange is considered vital to the
efficient administration of both large and small banks. 05
Two substantive suggestions were repeatedly offered by those responding to the Comptroller's request. First, it is strongly urged that
the amendment specifically address and negate any possible infer101. 41 Fed. Reg. 37,812 (1976). Commentators were asked to submit suggested wordings
or comments on:
a. Whether a "wall" should be required;
b. whether a lesser requirement would be preferable; that policies be established to insure that no investment decisions shall be made on the basis of significant non-public information;
c. whether such a regulation, affecting as it would only national banks, would
be effective;
d. whether some other form of restriction or prohibition is necessary.
Id.
102. 42 Fed. Reg. 56,338 (1977).
103. See, e.g., Letter from Neal L. Peterson, Assistant General Counsel, Bank of America,
to John Schockey, Deputy Comptroller of the Currency, at 2 (October 28, 1976). The letter
recommended the adoption of a regulation but rejected any "concept of a 'Wall' implying
requirements such as the separation of trust and fiduciary services from the commercial
banking functions by ... separation ... in the normal course of day-to-day business ....
"
Id. at 2; Letter from Robert H. Long, Senior Vice President, Harris Trust and Savings Bank,
Chicago, Illinois (October 21, 1976); Letter from John M. Karnick, Senior Vice President,
First Pennsylvania Bank, Philadelphia, Pa. (October 21, 1976), stating, "The Chinese Wall
is not the only nor necessarily the best approach ....
It is fraught with its own technical and
legal problems; ... and in any lOb-5 action it introduces an additional legal burden of proof
of the effective separation of the commercial and trust departments." Id. at 1; Letter from J.
Henry Brockhaus, Vice President and Trust Counsel, Seattle-First National Bank, Seattle,
Washington (October 19, 1976); Letter from F.L. Church, Jr., Executive Vice PresidentTrusts, The Riggs National Bank, Washington, D.C. (November 5, 1976). Contra, Letter from
Neil McKay, Vice Chairman of the Board and Cashier, The First National Bank of Chicago
(October 20, 1976); Letter from John F. Lee, Executive Vice President, New York Clearing
House, to Robert Bloom, Acting Comptroller of the Currency, at 2 (October 29, 1976).
104. See, e.g., Letter from Daniel R. Smith, Senior Vice President and Trust Officer, The
First National Bank, Kalamazoo, Michigan (September 20, 1976).
Because of the physical size of small banks, it would be difficult, if not impossible for many
of them to erect "walls" between their commercial and trust departments, not only in the
sense of accomplishing physical separation of the departments, but also in attempting to
require separation of personnel. Indeed, in many small banks, the person dealing with commercial matters is also the trust officer. See note 2 supra.
105. Letter from Robert H. Long, Senior Vice President, Harris Trust and Savings Bank,
Chicago, Illinois, at 1 (October 21, 1976).
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ence that knowledge possessed by the commercial department
should be imputed to the trust department. 00 Second, it was proposed that the amendment reiterate the rule that trustees, as fiduciaries, have no obligation to violate the law. Hence, they are not
required to use inside information for the advantage of beneficiar07
ies. 1
In response to the comments, the Comptroller recently revised the
language of the proposed amendment as follows:
The trust department may utilize personnel and facilities of
other departments of the bank, and other departments of the bank
may utilize personnel and facilities of the trust department only
to the extent not prohibited by law. Every national bank exercising
fiduciary powers shall adopt appropriate written policies and procedures to ensure that the Federal securities laws are complied
with in connection with any decision or recommendation to purchase or sell securities. Such policies and procedures, in particular,
shall ensure that national bank trust departments shall not use
material inside information in connection with any decision or
recommendation to purchase or sell securities.108
At the same time, the Comptroller expressed the opinion that the
objective sought by the amendment would be best achieved by a
"general and flexible" approach. 09 As a result, use of a Chinese wall
was not mandated by the revised proposal. Banks are free to choose
"appropriate written policies and procedures" to prohibit the use of
material inside information in connection with decisions and recommendations to purchase or sell securities."0
EFFECT OF THE COMPTROLLER'S PROPOSAL

Many commentators, although approving the earlier amendment
to the regulation, expressed concern that a regulation was not the
appropriate solution."' Yet, the consensus seemed to be that a regu106. See, e.g., Letter from Ben Ames Williams, Jr., Executive Vice President, The First
National Bank of Boston, at 2 (October 29, 1976).
107. See, e.g., Letter from John W. Heilshorn, Executive Vice-President Citibank, to the
Comptroller of the Currency, at 1 (October 18, 1976). But see Garrett Letter, supra note 84,
at 3, stating that while there is general agreement that a fiduciary is under no duty to perform
an illegal act, beneficiaries "are unlikely to agree that a trust department is justified in
purchasing or selling to their detriment when another department of the bank is in possession
of contrary information."
108. 42 Fed. Reg. 56,338, 56,339 (1977). Commentators had suggested that the language
of the proposal be drafted so that it would be more consistent with federal securities laws.
109. Id. at 56,338.
110. Id.
111. See, e.g., Letter from Victor J. Riley, Jr., President and Chief Executive Officer, First
Commercial Banks Inc., Albany, New York, at 1 (October 20, 1976); Letter from William D.
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lation was a "satisfactory stopgap measure pending enactment of
legislation.""' The recently proposed revision of the amendment,
however, is not even a "stopgap" measure. As proposed, it does little
more than reiterate federal securities law prohibitions on the use of
It provides no answers to the difficult
material inside information.
3
questions facing banks.1
The Comptroller's comments accompanying the proposal evade
the most controversial issues. The Comptroller merely repeats the
proposition that "a trustee has no duty to violate the law in order
to benefit his beneficiaries." Therefore, "beneficiaries cannot expect
their trustee to use material inside information whether actual or
imputed in connection with the sale or purchase of securities."" 4
This response is inadequate. The use of material inside information
to buy or sell securities for the benefit of trust beneficiaries has
never been the fundamental problem. The conclusion reached by
the Comptroller clarifies only the most obvious area.
Second, the Comptroller's comments recognize that mere knowledge of material inside information is not necessarily illegal or improper." 5 "Rather . . . it is primarily the intent to defraud or the
actual use of such information in connection with the purchase or
sale of securities which may lead to liability under section 10(b) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 thereunder."",
Yet, the Comptroller did not require the establishment of a Chinese
wall to prevent the illegal use of material inside information, apparently because of contrasting views concerning its effectiveness.
The lack of endorsement by the Comptroller of the Chinese wall
leaves unanswered the question of common law liability of trustees
when they engage in "negative""' 7 transactions. If use of material
inside information, and not mere knowledge violates rule 10b-5, the
issue becomes whether failure to obtain knowledge combined with
resulting damage to beneficiaries violates the trustee's fiduciary obAhonen, Vice-President and Attorney, National City Bank, Cleveland, Ohio, at 1 (October
22, 1976).
112. Letter from William D. Ahonen, Vice-President and Attorney, National City Bank,
Cleveland, Ohio, at 1 (October 22, 1976). But see Letter from W. Boardman Jones, Jr., Vice
Chairman of the Board, Mercantile Bank & Trust Company, St. Louis, Mo. (September 27,
1976).
113. The Comptroller's proposed regulation was recently deemed "superficial" and
"inadequate" by Federal Reserve Board staff members at a public meeting held to consider
his plan. Securities Week (BNA) at 9-10 (December 26, 1977).
113. 42 Fed. Reg. 56,338 (1977).
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. See text accompanying notes 84-91 supra.

19781

Comptroller's Regulation

ligations to beneficiaries. If the trust department obtains adverse
information about a particular corporate customer from the commercial department, and refrains from buying stock in that company, it has not used that information in the purchase or sale of a
security."' Nevertheless, the trustee has prevented damage to the
beneficiaries. The other type of negative transaction occurs when
the trust department receives beneficial information and sells. This
may not be a violation of rule 10b-5, since there would be no benefit
from acting contrary to the inside information. However, it may be
a breach of fiduciary duty of care."' This is the fundamental obstacle for those who favor the use an impermeable Chinese wall. It is
also a situation for which the regulation provides no guidance.
Finally, the proposed regulation and comments fail to specifically
consider the imputation of knowledge question first raised in
Slade. 120 As previously discussed, if a trustee actually knows of inside information, and buys or sells securities in accord with that
information, the bank may be liable under rule 10b-5.111 On the
other hand, if, as a consequence of the bank's Chinese wall (whether
permeable or impermeable) the trust department has no actual
knowledge of such information, there is no liability for positive
transactions unless the knowledge of the commercial department is
"imputed" to the trust department. "' At least one case,' however,
which held that a 10b-5 violation could not exist without intentional
wrongdoing, may have "exorcised the imputed knowledge specter."'A If this holding is applicable to a banking situation, and the
trust department has no actual knowledge, it will have acted innocently in such a positive transaction. Therefore, the trust department's lack of requisite intent could be ascribed to the bank as a
whole.'5 The courts, however, have not yet specifically accepted this
proposition. Many fear that if the validity of the imputation of
118. It should be noted, however, that systematic accrual by a trust department of such
material inside information for the purpose of avoiding or retaining investments could be
viewed as contrary to the purpose of the securities laws. It could be argued that such unique
access to information itself results in unfairness. Since rule 10b-5 has been interpreted in an
extremely elastic manner to prevent unfairness, it is not inconceivable that it could be
stretched this far. If such were the case, an injunctive action by the SEC in this situation
would be a possibility.
119. See generally Garrett Letter, supra note 84; Huck, supra note 7; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 174 (1959).
120. See text accompanying notes 69-71 supra.
121. See text accompanying note 87 supra.
122. See Garrett Letter, supra note 84, at 2.
123. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
124. Letter from Ben Ames Williams, Jr., Executive Vice President, The First National
Bank of Boston, at 2 (October 29, 1976).
125. Id.
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knowledge doctrine is upheld, the only recourse for banks will be to
divest themselves of their trust departments, a step which is felt by
many to be both economically and practically unworkable.'
CONCLUSION

The Comptroller's proposal is an illusory remedy to the fiduciary
problems faced by commercial banks. It does not, and perhaps cannot, speak to the banks' major concerns. So long as courts continue
to proceed on a case-by-case basis and refuse to establish clear
guidelines and Congress fails to provide explicit legislation addressed to these problems, banks will continue to perform conflicting fiduciary roles uncertain whether their adherence to the federal
securities laws can result in liability under the common law of
trusts.
DIANE S. LOCANDRO
126. For a discussion of the drawbacks of divestment, see Harfield, supra note 7; Lybecker, Regulation of Bank Trust Department Investment Activities: Seven Gaps, Eight
Remedies, 91 BANKING L.J. 6, 43-47 (1974); Mendez-Peiiate, supra note 7, at 705-09.

